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Abstract: This paper deals with the influence of different types of government expenditure on 
growth. It widens that proposed by the literature which follows the lines set by Barro (1990) 
because it adds the changes working through the demand side, generated by the variations in the 
distribution of the net income of the economy, to those working through the supply side, generated 
by the variations in factor productivity. The analysis considers a government sector with a balanced 
budget and an autonomous and nonlinear investment function, interpreted along a Kaleckian and a 
Classical-Harrodian line. It shows under which conditions different types of government 
expenditure are beneficial or detrimental for economic growth, comparing some results with those 
reached by Barro (1990) and points out the emergence of phenomena like multiple equilibria, 
hysteresis and low growth traps. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper deals with the role of different types of government expenditure in post-Keynesian 
analysis. This subject has been largely overlooked by this tradition of thought, in spite of the 
attention paid to it by its founders. As Pressman (1994) notices, Keynes underlined that there are 
economic and political reasons for preferring certain kinds of expenditures to others. Kaldor (1958, 
pp. 136-137; 1966; 1967; and 1971) pointed out that the composition of government expenditure 
has important effects on long-run growth. For him, a large government consumption can transform 
the economy into one with low investment, with some undesirable consequences on its international 
competitiveness and long-run growth due to the fact that the capital goods sector tends to enjoy 
higher rates of variation in productivity than the consumption goods sector. 
 
The views of Keynes and Kaldor, which provide interesting insights into the complexity of the 
growth processes, were presented in a descriptive way, nor have they been subsequently formalised 
by other authors. A formal treatment of the role of the government sector in the post-Keynesian 
theory of growth refers to one kind of expenditure without analysing the effects on the coefficients 
of production (see You and Dutt, 1996; Lavoie, 2000; Commendatore, Panico and Pinto, 2005).  
 
A more detailed account of the influence of government expenditure on growth can be found in the 
literature that follows the lines set by Barro (1990). This author assumes that government 
expenditure enters the production function and is complementary with private inputs. It has two 
opposite effects on the rate of growth, one positive, working through the increase in the productivity 
of private capital, and one negative, working through the reduction of saving due to the variation in 
tax revenues. The economic mechanisms captured by this analysis only refer to the effects on the 
rate of growth emerging in the production or supply side of the economy. Those produced by the 
variations in income distribution and effective demand are absent. 
 
In what follows an attempt is made to develop an analysis that also takes into account the influence 
on the rate of growth of the variations in income distribution and effective demand generated by 
changes in government expenditure. Like in Barro (1990), here too government expenditure enters 
the production function, even though not directly as an input, but indirectly by affecting the 
coefficients of production. Moreover, the increase in productivity does not necessarily lead to an 
increase in the rate of growth of the economy. In our analysis, however, this result is due to the 
assumption that government expenditure affects factor productivity and to other effects, generated 
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by the variations in income distribution and effective demand, which are absent in Barro’s analysis 
and can work in different ways. When government expenditure does not affect the coefficients of 
production (we define this kind of expenditure “unproductive”)1, its variations cause a transfer of 
income from the private to the government sector. When it affects the coefficients of production 
(we define this kind of expenditure “productive”) its variations can also cause a re-distribution of 
income between profit-earners (or capitalists) and wage-earners (or workers), depending on how the 
increase in productivity is appropriated by the two groups. In both cases, a change in effective 
demand occurs because the propensity to consume of the profit-earners (or of the capitalist class) is 
smaller than the propensity to spend of the government sector and the propensity to consume of the 
wage-earners (or of the working class). This change in turn causes a variation in the rate of growth 
of the economy. 
 
The analysis presented below develops a model that introduces a government sector, which works 
with a balanced budget, and an autonomous investment function, which is nonlinear. This second 
assumption allows the model to reproduce a variety of complex phenomena. Some of them, related 
to the analysis of what characterizes the equilibrium solutions, are examined in this paper. They 
clarify different aspects of how government intervention affects the rate of growth of the economy, 
underlining the possible occurrence of multiple equilibrium solutions, low growth traps and 
hysteresis. Some others, related to the analysis of the dynamic processes, are examined in a 
different essay (Commendatore, Panico and Pinto, 2009). They clarify the different ways in which 
government intervention can affect the stability of the economy, underlining the possible 
occurrence of regular and irregular growth cycles. 
 
The model can be interpreted along Kaleckian and Classical-Harrodian lines. The first interpretation 
considers the state of long-term expectations of investors as exogenously given, driven for instance 
by entrepreneurs’ animal spirits. The second considers that investors’ expectations are related to the 
“warranted rate of growth”, in the sense that the expected level of demand and output of the 
economy is the one corresponding to that rate.  
 
                                                    
1
 Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou  (1996, pp. 316-317) points out that in some path-breaking empirical works of the 1980s 
and the early 1990s the distinction between “productive” and “unproductive” government expenditure was related to 
that between “capital” and “current” government expenditure. In the subsequent years the difference between 
productive and unproductive changed and became related to the ability of each type of expenditure to influence 
positively the rate of growth of the economy. Within this approach every kind of expenditure could be productive or 
unproductive depending on its share in total expenditure. In what follows we take a different line and define 
“productive” and “unproductive” expenditures according to their ability to affect productivity. 
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Both interpretations underline, in opposition to the literature following the lines set by Barro 
(1990), the role played by income distribution and the fact that the rate of growth crucially depends 
on the influence of government expenditure on after-tax profits. In the Kaleckian interpretation the 
rate of growth moves in the contrary direction to after-tax profits. In the Classical-Harrodian 
interpretation the opposite tendency occurs. The different result depends on the investment function.  
 
In the Kaleckian interpretation proposed below the degree of capital utilization is what matters, so 
that, on account of the low propensity to consume of the profit-earners, effective demand rises when 
after-tax profits decrease, leading entrepreneurs to invest more. This expansionary influence  on 
effective demand is able to produce structural breaks, movements away from “ low growth traps” 
and hysteresis effects.  
 
In the Classical-Harrodian interpretation a prominent role is played by the “warranted rate of 
growth”, which is linked to saving in such a way as to establish a direct relationship between the 
rate of growth and after-tax profits. In this interpretation there are no structural breaks and 
hysteresis effects, but it is possible to identify a size of the government sector that maximizes the 
rate of growth. There is here some similarity with the results reached by Barro (1990), in the sense 
that the relationship between the rate of growth and the size of the government sector has the shape 
of a bell. In the Classical-Harrodian analysis however the shape of this relationship depends on the 
variations in the distribution of income within the economy, rather than on the assumption that the 
marginal productivity is decreasing. 
 
Finally, both the Kaleckian and  the Classical-Harrodian analyses make it possible to extend to an 
economy with the government sector some growth regimes identified by the post-Keynesian 
literature. 
 
The paper is so organised. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 deals with its Kaleckian 
interpretation showing how “productive” and “unproductive” government expenditures can affect 
the rate of growth within this framework. Section 4 deals with the Classical-Harrodian 
interpretation of the model and its results. Section 5 presents some conclusions. 
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2. The model 
 
We consider a single-good closed economy with two inputs of production: labour (L) with a 
perfectly elastic supply and fixed capital (K) that does not depreciate. Technical progress is 
excluded and the production function is of a Leontief type. 1/a and 1/b represent the capital and 
labour coefficients, respectively. Moreover in each period the capital stock is not fully utilised and 
Pu Y Y= , where u is the degree of capacity utilization, Y is the current output and YP is the potential 
output. Under these assumptions the following conditions hold: 
 
PY bL aK Y= ≤ =  
 
Income is distributed between wages and profits: Y wL rK= + , where w is the wage rate and r is the 
rate of profit. By normalising with respect to output we get 1pi ω+ = , where pi is the share of profits 
and ω is the share of wages in national income. Moreover, the following relationship between the 
rate of profit and capital utilisation holds: 
 
 
Y
r au
K
pi
pi= =
  
 
The wage rate is a function of labour productivity and depends on the bargaining power of the 
unions: 
 
 
( ) 0 0w w b wb with and wλ λ= = ≥ >
  (1) 
 
where λ  is the wage-productivity elasticity and measures the ability of the unions to capture labour 
productivity improvements. When 1λ <  workers only capture a portion of the increase in 
productivity; when instead 1λ ≥  the increase in the wage rate is equal or higher than the rate of 
variation of productivity. 
 
The model assumes that workers do not save and the investment function is not linear: 
  
 
(1 ) (1 )s s r s aupi piτ pi τ= − = −  (2) 
  
 ( )= +g uα φ  (3) 
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where s is the ratio between saving and capital, spi  is the propensity to save out of profits, τ is the 
tax rate and g is the rate of variation of capital, which depends on an autonomous term (α) and on a 
nonlinear component ( ( )uφ ) which enjoys the following properties:2 
 
 ( ) 0, 0, ( ) 0 ( )′ ′′= > ≥ < ≤ >% %u and for u uφ φ φ   
 
where 0 1< ≤%u  is the “normal” degree of capacity utilization, interpreted as the optimal degree of 
capacity utilization given the existing technology. 
 
Equation (3) assumes that investment is an “S-shaped” function of the degree of capacity utilisation 
(see Figures 1 and 4 below): when capacity utilisation is low the propensity to invest is weak, it 
improves when capacity utilisation rises, and slows down again when capital utilisation is high.3 
 
The autonomous component of the investment function can be interpreted along two different lines. 
Following a Kaleckian interpretation, =α α  reflects entrepreneurs’ animal spirits and is taken as 
given like the state of long-term expectations in Keynesian models (see Rowthorn, 1981; Dutt, 
1984; Amadeo, 1986; and Lavoie 1992). Along a Classical-Harrodian interpretation, gα = % , where 
(1 )g s rpi τ= −% %  is the warranted rate of growth and ≡% %r aupi  is the rate of profit corresponding to 
normal capacity utilisation (for a similar interpretation, see Commendatore, D’Acunto, Panico and 
Pinto, 2003; and Shaikh, 2007).  
 
The model further assumes that the government sector operates with a balanced budget:4 
 
 τ γ=  (4) 
 
where taxation and government expenditure γ  are measured in terms of net income.  
 
                                                    
2
 For simplicity, we do not incorporate the rate of profit into the investment function. The introduction of this variable 
in the investment function does not qualitatively modify the results reached below.  
3
 A nonlinear investment function, justified by the presence of increasing installation costs, of the increasing risk of 
entering new projects and by the difficulty of getting additional funding with the same net wealth, can be found in 
Kalecki (1937), Kaldor (1940) and Chang and Smith (1973). Recently, other works have used it (Bischi, Dieci, Rodano 
and Saltari, 2001; Gong, 2001; Bruno, 2005). In Commendatore (2006), a different nonlinearity, concerning firms’ 
mark-up, is introduced in a Kaleckian model and in a model with Classical-Harrodian features. 
4
 The effects of government deficits and debt on growth, assuming a linear investment function and “unproductive” 
government expenditure, are explored by You and Dutt (1990) and Lavoie (2000) in Kaleckian models and by 
Commendatore, Panico and Pinto (2005) in the post-Keynesian theory of growth and personal distribution. 
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Like Barro (1990, p. S107), we assume that the government enhances input productivity by 
purchasing goods and services that are freely provided to the private sector.5 Unlike Barro, 
however, in our analysis the influence of government expenditure is described as a positive 
externality that changes the input coefficients. Moreover, we only focus on the case in which it 
influences b, the labour productivity:6 
  
 ( ) (0) 0, 0 0′ ′′= > ≥ ≤b b with b b and bγ  (5) 
 
When government expenditure affects labour productivity, the wage share may vary too, depending 
on the bargaining power of the unions, i.e. on the value of λ. This assumption makes it possible, 
using equations (1), (4) and (5), to describe pre-tax profits as a function of government expenditure: 
 
 ( ) 1( ) 1 w b λpi pi γ γ −= = −     (6) 
 
where 
 
 ( ) (1 )[1 ( )] ( )bpi γ λ pi γ γ′ ′= − − ≥< 0      for     λ ≤> 1 (7)  
 
If the wage rate increases less than labour productivity, pre-tax profits increase. The opposite occurs 
when the wage rate increases more than labour productivity. 
 
The influence of government expenditure on after-tax profits, (1 )pi pi γ= −) , can be described as 
follows: 
 
 (1 )pi pi γ pi′ ′= − −)  (8) 
 
The sign of this derivative depends on b′ , the effect of government expenditure on labour 
productivity, and on λ, the elasticity of wages to changes in productivity. We identify three cases in 
which, for all values of γ , the sign is negative: 
 
1. Government expenditure does not affect labour productivity, i.e. 0b′ = , from which it 
follows 0pi ′ = ; 
                                                    
5
 Taking into account the existence of capital owned by the government sector  would increase the complexity of the 
analysis. We leave this study to further research. 
6
 The analysis of the influence of government expenditure on the productivity of capital is not qualitatively different 
from that developed here.  
 8
2. Government expenditure affects labour productivity, 0b′ > , and wages rise at least at the 
same rate as productivity, 1λ ≥ , which implies 0pi ′ ≤ , i.e. that pre-tax profits do not 
increase; 
3. Government expenditure affects labour productivity, 0b′ > , and wages rise less than 
productivity, 1λ < , but the increase in pre-tax profits, 0pi ′ > ,  is not sufficient to counteract 
the rise in taxation. In this case, after-tax profits decrease, 0pi ′ <) . 
 
The sign of this derivative is instead positive in one case: when 0b′ > , 1λ <  and the increase in 
pre-tax profits more than compensate the rise in taxation. It follows the increase of after-tax profits, 
0pi ′ >) . In this case, since 0pi ′′ < , it is possible to identify a level of government expenditure, 
0 1mγ< < , which maximises after-tax profits and changes the sign of the derivative from positive to 
negative. Thus, the sign is positive only for 0 1mγ γ≤ < < . When instead mγ γ> , we have a fourth 
case in which after-tax profits decrease when government expenditure rises because the increase of 
pre-tax profits becomes again smaller than the rise in taxation.7 
 
The equilibrium solutions for the degree of capacity utilisation,
 
*u , and for the rate of growth, 
*g , 
are obtained from equations (2), (3) and (4) by taking γ  as an independent variable and imposing 
the condition g = s. 
 
The dynamic behaviour of the system is generated by the variation in the degree of capital 
utilisation in the face of a discrepancy between demand and supply, i.e. between investment and 
saving: 
 
 1 ( )u u g sθ+ − = −  (9) 
 
where 0>θ  is the speed at which capacity utilisation adjusts to the discrepancy between saving and 
investment. 
                                                    
7
 Notice that when 0b′> and 1λ < ,  two cases can occur: (i) after-tax profits decrease for any 0 1γ≤ ≤ ; or (ii) after tax-
profits increase for 0 mγ γ≤ <  and decrease for 1mγ γ< ≤ . This is shown as follows: consider first that since 0b′> , 
0b′′≤  and 1λ < , it follows that 0pi ′>  and (1 )[ (1 ) ] 0b bpi λ pi pi′′ ′ ′ ′′= − − − − < . Moreover, by differentiating equation (8), 
we obtain (1 ) 2pi pi γ pi′′ ′′ ′= − −) , which is negative for any 1γ ≤ .  If (0) 0pi ′ <) , since 0pi ′′<) , it follows that 0pi ′<)  for any 
0 1γ≤ ≤ . On the contrary, if (0) 0pi ′ >) , since  (1) 0pi ′ <)  and 0pi ′′<)  for 1γ ≤ , there exists a unique value of γ , 
0 1mγ< < , such that 0pi ≥′<
) for mγ γ≤> .  
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In what follows we assume that 
1
*2 ( )F s a upiθ θ pi φ
−
′ < ≡ − 
)
. In this case, the equilibrium solutions 
are stable if the slope of the saving function is steeper than that of the investment function, i.e. 
  
 
*( )s a upipi φ ′>)  (10) 
 
Commendatore, Panico and Pinto (2009) abandons this assumption to analyze the dynamic 
processes generated by the model and the occurrence of regular and irregular cycles. 
 
 
 
3. The Kaleckian interpretation 
 
In the Kaleckian interpretation the autonomous component of the investment function represents  
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits. With α α= , the equilibrium solutions are:8  
  
 
*
* ( )u
u
s api
α φ
pi
+
= )  (11) 
          
* *g s aupipi=
)
 (12) 
 
There can be up to three solutions depending on the value of γ  . They are indentified in Figure 1 by 
( )* *,≡L L Le u g , ( )* *,≡I I Ie u g  and ( )* *,≡H H He u g , the points of intersection between the saving and 
the investment functions.9 The intermediate equilibrium solution Ie  is unstable because it violates 
condition (10). For Le  and He , instead, the stability condition (10) holds. When three solutions 
exist, the economy converges either to the low or to the high equilibrium solution depending on the 
initial conditions: if 0 Iu u< <  the economy converges towards Le , if 1Iu u< ≤  towards He . The 
convergence towards Le  makes it possible to talk of a “low growth equilibrium trap”. 
 
                                                    
8
 We exclude the possibility that demand exceeds the maximum level of  capacity utilisation. 
9
 In Figure 1 the saving and investment functions are plotted by taking α as given and assuming that γ  takes the 
following values: (a) γ = 0, (b) γ = 0.12 and (c) γ = 0.24. The values of the other parameters are the following: 0.5=%u , 
α = 0.07, a = 0.5, 0.6w =  and 0.8=spi . As an explicit form for the nonlinear component of the investment function we 
choose 1 2( ) arctan( ( ))= − %u u uφ β β , where 1 0.015=β  and 2 15=β ; and as an explicit form for the average labour 
productivity function we choose 0 1 2( ) arctan( )b b b bγ γ= + , where 0 1b = , 1 0b =  and 2 7.5b = . For these values of 0b , 
1b  and 2b we have that 0b′ = . For reasons of space we do not provide here a graphical representation where the values 
of the parameters allow 0b′ > . This graphical representation would be similar to Figures 1(a)-(c). 
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Figure 1 
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The influence of government expenditure on the equilibrium solutions is described by the following 
derivatives : 
 
**
*( )
s a udu
d s a u
pi
pi
pi
γ pi φ
′
= −
′−
)
)           (13) 
  
 
**
*
*
( )( )
s a udg
u
d s a u
pi
pi
pi φ
γ pi φ
′
′= −
′−
)
)      (14)
 
 
 
For the stable equilibrium solutions Le and He , the sign of the derivatives depends on the effect of 
government expenditure on after-tax profits. If 0pi ′ <)  the sign of the two derivatives is positive: 
government expenditure has an expansionary effect on capital utilisation and growth.  If 0pi ′ >)  the 
opposite occurs.  
  
As said in the previous section, 0pi ′ <)  when the conditions described in the following Table hold: 
 
Table 1 
Case 1 0b′ =   0 1γ≤ <  
Case 2 0b′ >  1λ ≥   i.e. 0pi ′ ≤  0 1γ≤ <  
Case 3 0b′ >  1λ <   i.e. 0pi ′ >  0 1γ≤ <  
Case 4 0b′ >  1λ <   i.e. 0pi ′ >  0 1mγ γ< < <  
 
u uu
,g s ,g s ,g s
Ie
Le
He
Le
He
%u %u %u
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The expansionary influence on capital utilisation and growth occurring in these cases extends the 
Kaleckian “paradox of costs” to the analysis of an economy in which the government sector plays 
an active role (see  Rowthorn, 1981). The “paradox of costs” holds for the two stable equilibrium 
solutions, but not for the unstable intermediate solution Ie . 
 
The results generated by the Kaleckian interpretation of our model can be further appreciated by 
considering three other graphical representations, in which the equilibrium values *u and *g  are 
related to the values of γ . 
 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) describe the equilibrium values of *u and *g  at different levels of γ  when 
after-tax profits always decrease, 0pi ′ <) .10 In both figures, for 10 Tγ γ≤ < , there is one equilibrium 
solution, which corresponds to point Le  of Figure 1(a).  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
                                                    
10
 Figures 2(a) and 2(b) assume 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.24 and, for the other parameters, the same values used in Figure 1. Notice too 
that in Figure 2 and in the following Figures 3, 4, 6 and 7, the vertical axis represents the difference between the 
equilibrium and the normal degree of capacity utilisation. 
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Both the degree of capacity utilisation and the rate of growth  increase with government 
expenditure. For 1 2< <T Tγ γ γ , owing to a “fold bifurcation”, two new equilibrium solutions 
emerge (corresponding Ie  and He  of Figure 1(b)). The degree of capital utilisation and the rate of 
growth increase with γ  when the equilibrium solutions Le  and He  prevail. On the contrary they 
decrease when the equilibrium solution Ie  prevails. Finally, for 
2Tγ γ> , owing to the occurrence of 
another “fold bifurcation”, there is again one equilibrium solution, which corresponds to point He  
of Figure 1(c). Once again the degree of capacity utilisation and the rate of growth increase with 
government expenditure. 
 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) also show that for 20 Tγ γ≤ < , if the low equilibrium solution prevails, an 
increase in government expenditure raises capital utilisation and growth. When γ  overtakes 2Tγ  a 
structural break occurs, meaning that the economy shifts to the high equilibrium solution, where, 
owing to the shape of the equilibrium curves, it remains even if 1 2T Tγ γ γ≤ < . This result shows the 
existence of hysteresis effects. 
 
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) describe the equilibrium values of *u  and *g  at different levels of γ  when 
after-tax profits increase for 0 1mγ γ≤ < <  and decrease for mγ γ> .11 In the case 0pi ′ >) , for the 
stable equilibrium solutions, Le  and He , the degree of capital utilisation and the rate of growth 
decrease when government expenditure increases. On the contrary, if 0pi ′ <) , variations of 
government expenditure have a positive effect on the degree of capital utilisation and the rate of 
growth. 
 
These results again confirm the validity of the “paradox of costs” for the stable equilibrium 
solutions. Moreover they confirm that in Kaleckian analysis growth is always driven by demand. It 
is driven by government expenditure when changes in this variable have a negative effect on after-
tax profits. This is shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) for all values of public expenditure and in Figures 
2(c) and 2(d) for mγ γ> . When their changes have instead a positive effect on after-tax profits, 
                                                    
11
 Figures 2(c), 2(d), like Figures 3 and 4, are plotted for 0 0.4γ≤ ≤ . The other parameters take the following values: 
0.5=%u , α = 0.07, a = 0.5, 0.72w = , 0.8=spi , 1 0.02β = , 2 15=β , 0 1b = , 1 1.15b =  and 2 7.5b = . Moreover, in 
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) 0.6λ = and in Figure 4 0.628λ =
 
, whereas in Figure 3 the wage-productivity elasticity is varied 
within the interval 0.6 0.85λ≤ ≤ . 
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growth is driven by the rise in the wage share generated by the reduction in the dimension of 
government intervention. This is shown in Figures 2(c) and 2(d) for 0 1mγ γ≤ < < . 
 
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) also show the existence of four bifurcation points, two of them, 1Tγ  and 2Tγ , 
located at the left, the other two, 3Tγ  and 4Tγ , located at the right of mγ . A structural break occurs 
at each bifurcation point: the economy shifts either from high to low growth or from low to high 
growth, with associated hysteresis effects. 
 
While in Figure 2 we assume that the wage-productivity elasticity is given, in Figure 3 we let λ  
vary to verify how different assumptions on workers’ ability to appropriate changes in productivity 
influence the relationship between government expenditure, on the one side, and capacity utilisation 
and growth, on the other. An increase in λ  implies a movement towards the origin of the axes and a 
consequent increase in the degree of capital utilisation and in the rate of growth. This too is a 
typical Kaleckian result: it confirms that an improvement in the wage share has a positive effect on 
growth. 
 
Figure 3 
 
degree of capacity utilization rate of growth
 
*
− %u u
γ ( )1− λ γ ( )1− λ
*g
 
 
Figure 3 also clarifies that for values of λ  close to 1, we get that variations in government 
expenditure only generate movements from low to high equilibrium solutions, provided that the 
former exist. On the contrary, for values of λ  close to 0, unlike what happens in Figure 2(c) and 
2(d), we only have two structural breaks and hysteresis effects generating a “high growth trap”. 
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This result can be more clearly appreciated by looking at Figure 4, which is another section of 
Figure 3 for a value of λ  higher than that assumed in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
4. The Classical-Harrodian interpretation 
 
In the Classical-Harrodian interpretation the expected rate of growth of demand is the warranted 
rate of growth, g s aupiα pi= =
)
% %
 and the solutions for u and g are 
 
 
*
* ( )u
u u
s api
φ
pi
= +% )  (15) 
 
 
* *( )= +%g g uφ  (16) 
 
There can be either one or three equilibrium solutions, denoted in Figure 5 by ( ),≡% % %e u g , 
( )* *,≡L L Le u g  and ( )* *,≡H H He u g . The first solution corresponds to the normal capacity utilisation 
and to the warranted rate of growth. The other two solutions correspond to a level of capacity 
utilisation different from normal.12 The number of solutions depends on the value of γ . In Figure 
5(a), the equilibrium solution e%  satisfies condition (10) and is globally stable. In Figure 5(b) there 
                                                    
12
 In Figure 5, γ takes the following values: (a) γ = 0 and (b) γ = 0.4; the value of the other parameters are 0.5=%u , 
a = 0.5, 0.8=spi , 0.6w = , 1 0.02β = , 2 7.5β = , 0 1b = , 1 0b =  and 2 7.5b = . Owing to 0 1b =
 
and 1 0b = , we have 
that 0b′ = .  
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are three solutions. The one corresponding to normal capacity utilisation ( %e ) is unstable; the other 
two ( Le  and He ) are symmetrical with respect to %e  and are locally stable because condition (10) 
holds. The economy converges either to Le  or He  depending on the initial value of u: if it is smaller 
than u% , the adjustment process leads to the low equilibrium solution; otherwise, it leads to the high 
equilibrium solution. 
 
 
Figure 5 
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The effects of government expenditure on the equilibrium degree of capacity utilization and rate of 
growth are described by the following derivatives: 
 
 
*
*
*
( )( )
s adu
u u
d s a u
pi
pi
pi
γ pi φ
′
= − −
′−
)
%)  (17) 
 
* * *
*
( )1 ( )
dg u u u
s au
d s a u upi pi
φ
pi
γ pi φ
 ′
−
′= − 
′
− 
%)
% )
%
 (18) 
 
They show that the influence of government intervention on the economy is more complex than in 
the Kaleckian interpretation. The signs of the derivatives do not depend only on the influence on 
after-tax profits and the equilibrium degree of capital utilisation and rate of growth may change in 
opposite directions. 
 
The sign of derivative (17) is positive for u u> %  and negative for u u< %
 
if 0pi ′ <) : government 
expenditure has an expansionary effect on degree of capital utilisation when this is already above its 
,g s ,g s
uu
e%
e%
Le
He
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normal value. The opposite occurs if 0pi ′ >) , a case described by Figure 6(c) when mγ γ< . The 
results of the Kaleckian interpretation presented above are thus confirmed when the economy works 
at a degree of capital utilization greater than normal. 
 
The sign of derivative (18) is positive when 0pi ′ >)  and * *( )s au u upipi φ ′>) % . The expansionary 
influence of government expenditure depends on the relative weight of after-tax profits and the 
degree of capital utilisation on investment decisions. As a matter of fact, we can write the previous 
condition as follows, by noticing that *g s aupipi∂ ∂ =
)
%
 and * * *( )g u uφ′∂ ∂ = : 
 
 *
* * *
* * *u
g g u
g u gpi
piη η
pi
∂ ∂
≡ > ≡
∂ ∂
)
)
)  (19) 
 
where piη )  is the elasticity of the rate of growth with respect to after-tax profits and uη  is the 
elasticity of the rate of growth with respect to the degree of capital utilisation. Condition (19) is 
always satisfied when the equilibrium solutions e%  and *Le  prevail. When the equilibrium solution 
*
He  prevails, condition (19) does not necessarily hold. 
 
Instead, if 0pi ′ <)  the sign of derivative (18) is negative when *upiη η>) . This condition again is 
satisfied for e%  
 
and *Le , whereas it does not necessarily hold for *He . When the sign of derivative is 
positive the results of the Classical-Harrodian interpretation resemble those of the Kaleckian one, 
because the degree capital utilisation plays a more prominent role that after-tax profits in 
determining investment decisions.  
 
The analysis of Figures 6 and 7 further clarify the relationship between the size of the government 
sector and the equilibrium values of capital utilisation and the rate of growth.13 
 
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) deal with the case of always decreasing after-tax profits, 0pi ′ <) . For 
0 Pγ γ≤ <  there is one equilibrium solution, as in Figure 5(a). This solution corresponds to the 
                                                    
13
 Figures 6(a) and 6(b) are plotted for 0 0.24γ≤ ≤  and, for the other parameters, the same values used in Figure 5. 
Figures 6(c), 6(d) and 7 are plotted for 0 0.4γ≤ ≤ . The other parameters take the following values: 0.5=%u , a = 0.5, 
0.72w = , 0.8=spi , 1 0.02β = , 2 7.5β = , 0 1b = , 1 1.15b =  and 2 7.5b = . Moreover, 0.6λ =  in Figures 6(c) and 6(d) 
whereas in Figure 7 the wage-productivity elasticity is varied within the interval 0.6 0.85λ≤ ≤ . 
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warranted rate of growth %e , which is asymptotically stable. When γ  overtakes Pγ  two new 
equilibrium solutions emerge owing to a pitchfork bifurcation. They correspond to Le  and He  of 
Figure 5(b), which are symmetrical with respect to %e
 
and locally stable, unlike %e  that is now 
unstable. 
Figure 6 
  
 
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) also show that the relationship between the size of the government sector and 
*u  and *g  have different trends. In Figure 6(a) for Pγ γ>  the low equilibrium solution of the 
degree of capital utilisation is monotonically decreasing, the intermediate solution is constant and 
the high equilibrium solution is monotonically increasing. On the contrary, in Figure 6(b) for 
Pγ γ>  the low and the intermediate equilibrium solutions of the rate of growth are monotonically 
decreasing, while the high equilibrium solution is increasing for Mγ γ< and  decreasing for Mγ γ> . 
The value of government expenditure Mγ , which maximises the rate of growth, makes *upiη η=) . 
 
The trends of the low and the intermediate equilibrium solutions in Figure 6(b) point out that the 
equilibrium rate of growth decreases when government expenditure increases and after-tax profits 
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decrease. One can thus claim that there is a profit-led growth when the size of the government 
sector decreases. Moreover, for the low equilibrium solutions we have that both *g  and *u  move in 
the same direction as profits. Badhuri and Marglin (1990) define this regime “exhilarationist”. 
 
Profit-led growth also holds for the high equilibrium solution when Mγ γ>  and *upiη η>) . In this 
case *g  and *u  move in the opposite direction, as occurs in the “conflictual stagnationist” regime, 
defined by Badhuri and Marglin (1990).  
 
The occurrence of a profit-led regime for the stable equilibrium solutions differentiates the results 
of the Classical-Harrodian interpretation from those of the Kaleckian interpretation. 
 
On the contrary, for P Mγ γ γ< < , the equilibrium rate of growth increases when government 
expenditure increases and after-tax profits decrease. Growth is thus led by the government sector, 
with the further support of the wage share when government expenditure affects labour productivity 
and wages rise at least at the same rate as productivity. The opposite trends of the rate of growth 
and of after-tax profits make it possible to say that in this particular case, as in the Kaleckian 
analysis, the “paradox of costs” holds. Yet in all other cases the increase in the size of the 
government sector is not beneficial to growth.  
 
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) also shows that, unlike what happens in the Kaleckian analysis, in the 
Classical-Harrodian interpretation there are no structural breaks and then no escape from “low 
growth traps” and no hysteresis effects. 
 
Figures 6(c) and 6(d) deal with the case of after tax profits increasing when 0 1mγ γ≤ < <  and 
decreasing when mγ γ> . For 10 Pγ γ≤ <  there are three equilibrium solutions, as in Figure 5(b). 
When γ  overtakes 1Pγ , a pitchfork bifurcation occurs and there is one asymptotically stable 
equilibrium solution. 
 
Figures 6(c) and 6(d) also show that the relationships between the size of the government sector and 
*u  and *g  have different trends. In Figure 6(c) the relationship between the size of the government 
sector and capital utilisation is increasing when the low equilibrium solution prevails, constant for 
the warranted equilibrium solution, and decreasing for the high one. Notice that for mγ γ>  the 
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increase in γ  generates a reduction of after-tax profits ( 0pi ′ <) ) as occurs in Figure 6(a), and the 
relationship between γ  and *u  has the same trend as that described by that Figure. 
 
Figure 6(d) shows that the relationship between the size of the government sector and the 
equilibrium rate of growth has a more complex behaviour than that between the size of the 
government sector and the degree of capital utilisation. The low equilibrium solutions show an 
increasing relationship for mγ γ<  and a decreasing one for mγ γ> . The trend of this relationship 
thus depends on the effect of government expenditure on after-tax profits, and is similar to that of 
the relationship between the size of government sector and the equilibrium degree of capital 
utilisation. 
 
The trends of the warranted and the low equilibrium solutions are similar: they both depend on the 
influence of government expenditure on after-tax profits. The relationship has the shape of a bell 
and resembles what can be found in Barro (1990), without necessarily depending on the assumption 
that marginal productivity is decreasing. Growth is maximised when after-tax profits reach their 
maximum level, unlike what happens in Kaleckian analysis where growth reaches its minimum 
level when after-tax profits are maximised. 
 
The high equilibrium solutions show that for 1Mγ γ<  there is an increasing relationship of 
government expenditure with the equilibrium rate of growth and with after-tax profits. For 
1 1M Pγ γ γ< < , instead, the relationship of government expenditure with the equilibrium rate of 
growth is decreasing, while that with after-tax profits is increasing.  In 1Pγ  a pitchfork bifurcation 
occurs and a unique equilibrium solution emerges. When mγ γ>  the relationship between γ  and *g  
is similar to that described in Figure 6(b) as the increase in the size of the government sector 
generates a reduction in after-tax profits ( 0pi ′ <) ). 
 
The trends of the low and the warranted equilibrium solutions in Figure 6(d) point out that there is 
profit-led growth. For the low equilibrium solutions we have again an “exhilarationist” regime. 
 
Profit-led growth also holds for the high equilibrium solutions when 1Mγ γ<  and when 2Mγ γ> . In 
both cases the elasticity of the rate of growth with respect to after-tax profits is greater than the 
elasticity with respect to the equilibrium degree of capital utilisation (
*upiη η>) ). This result 
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confirms once again the prominent role of the re-distributive effects in this analysis and indicates 
that for these values of γ
 
a “conflictual stagnationist” regime prevails. 
 
A different growth regime prevails for the other values of γ  in the high equilibrium solutions. For 
1 1M Pγ γ γ< <  the equilibrium rate of growth decreases when government expenditure rises. When 
instead 2 2P Mγ γ γ< <  a rise in the government expenditure has a positive effect on the equilibrium 
rate of growth. In both cases 
*upiη η<)
 
and the equilibrium rate of growth moves in the opposite 
direction of after-tax profits and in the same direction as the equilibrium degree of capital 
utilisation. Growth is wage-led for 1 1M Pγ γ γ< < . It is driven instead by government expenditure, 
with the further support of the wage share, for 2 2P Mγ γ γ< < . The “paradox of costs” holds in both 
cases, so that we have here the same result reached in the Kaleckian analysis presented above. 
 
In Figures 6(c) and 6(d), like in Figures 6(a) and 6(b), there are no structural breaks and no 
hysteresis effects. None the less, the possibility that in some cases variations in γ  generate a 
movement from an equilibrium growth path to another cannot be excluded. 
 
Finally, to verify how different assumptions on workers’ ability to appropriate changes in 
productivity influence the effects of government expenditure on capacity utilisation and growth, in 
Figure 7 we let the wage-productivity elasticity (λ ) vary.  
 
Figure 7 
degree of capacity utilization rate of growth
 
 
( )1− λ
*
− %u u
γ
*g
( )1− λ
γ
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If it increases, we move towards the origin of the axis, where there are three equilibrium solutions 
for all values of γ  and shifts from one equilibrium growth path to another, through changes in the 
size of the government sector, must be excluded. 
 
To sum up, the results of the Classical-Harrodian interpretation tend to diverge from those of the 
Kaleckian one on account of the different role attributed to after-tax profits and to the degree of 
capital utilization in the investment function. The former interpretation emphasizes the role in 
investment decisions of the rate of profit associated with the “warranted rate of growth”, whereas 
the latter considers the role of the rate of profit associated with a degree of capital utilization 
different from normal. Thus, in the Classical-Harrodian analysis the rate of capital accumulation 
tends to move in the contrary direction to that of the Kaleckian analysis, except in some particular 
cases, pointed out above, in which the degree of capital utilization can play a more prominent role 
than after-tax profits in affecting investment decisions. 
 
The following Table summarises the results achieved in this Section, comparing them with those 
reached in the previous Section. 
 
Table 2 
 
 
Kaleckian case Classical/Harrodian case 
u* g* u* g* 
0pi ′ <)  
low:  positive 
intermediate: negative 
high: positive 
low:  positive 
intermediate: negative 
high: positive 
low:  negative 
normal: no effect 
high: positive 
low:  negative 
normal: negative 
high: first positive 
          then negative 
0pi ′ >)  
low:  negative 
intermediate: positive 
high: negative 
low:  negative 
intermediate: positive 
high: negative 
low: positive 
normal: no effect 
high: negative 
low:  positive 
normal: positive 
high: first positive 
          then negative 
 
 
The results also point out the existence of differences between the two interpretations as to the 
occurrence of structural breaks and hysteresis effects and as to the growth regimes that can emerge. 
With respect to the Kaleckian one, in the Classical-Harrodian analysis there are no structural breaks 
and no hysteresis effects. Moreover, a profit-led regime appears in addition to those emerging in the 
Kaleckian analysis. 
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Finally, the Classical-Harrodian analysis allows the identification of a size of the government sector 
that maximizes the rate of growth, as occurs in Barro (1990). This however depends on the 
influence of changes in government expenditure on income distribution and effective demand, 
which is overlooked by the literature following the lines set by Barro (1990). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The analysis presented above of the effects of the different types of government expenditure on 
growth widens that proposed by the literature that follows the lines set by Barro (1990). It adds the 
changes working through the demand side, generated by the variations in the distribution of the net 
income of the economy, to those working through the supply side, generated by the variations in 
factor productivity. 
 
The analysis has considered a government sector with a balanced budget and an autonomous and 
nonlinear investment function, interpreted along a Kaleckian and a Classical-Harrodian line. It 
shows that for both interpretations the influence of government expenditure on the rate of growth 
depends on that on after-tax profits. Moreover, it points out that, due to their specification of the 
investment function, the two interpretations can generate different results, the most important of 
which are summarized below, recalling that for convenience of exposition we have defined 
“unproductive” the expenditure that does not affect labor productivity and “productive” the 
expenditure that has a positive effect on it: 
• In the Kaleckian analysis, for both “productive” and “unproductive” government 
expenditure, the rate of growth moves in the contrary direction to after-tax profits, whereas 
in the Classical-Harrodian analysis the opposite tendency occurs. 
• In the Kaleckian analysis the influence of “unproductive” expenditure is always beneficial to 
growth, whereas in the Classical-Harrodian analysis it tends to be detrimental. 
• The influence of “productive” expenditure is more complex and tends to be different in the 
two analyses. None the less, when in the Classical-Harrodian analysis the degree of capital 
utilization achieves a more prominent role than after-tax profits in investment decisions, the 
influence of “productive” expenditure is the same as in the Kaleckian one. 
• The Kaleckian analysis shows, for both kinds of expenditure, the occurrence of phemomena 
(structural breaks, movements away from the “low growth traps” and hysteresis effects), 
which do not emerge in the Classical-Harrodian one. 
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• Finally, when expenditure is “productive” it is possible to identify in the Classical-
Harrodian analysis a size of the government sector which maximizes the rate of growth. 
This result resembles that reached by Barro (1990), but depends on the variations in the 
distribution of income within the economy, rather than on the assumption that marginal 
productivity is decreasing. Moreover, in the Classical-Harrodian analysis the maximum rate 
of growth is associated with the maximum level of after-tax profits, whereas in the 
Kaleckian analysis when after-tax profits reach their maximum level, the rate of growth is 
minimized. 
 
The different results underline the complexity of the problem considered and the importance of 
investigating all forces at  work. 
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